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ABSTRACT: In recent years many European governments reacted to the economic crisis intro-
ducing austerity measures that particularly affected Local Public Services (LPSs) through out-
sourcing, privatization and marketization. While several studies have analysed the logics of in-
struments choice also in this policy sector, the political discourses and policy frames that ac-
companied the tools selection for the management of LPSs in the last years have been paid lim-
ited attention in the scholarly literature. Starting from these premises, the article analyses the 
debate on LPSs that has developed in Italy since 2008, reconstructing the frames used by the 
main parties through the analysis of both electoral manifestos and press reviews of articles rele-
vant to LPSs in three newspapers. Particular attention is paid to the 2011 referendum against 
the privatization of LPSs and the 2018 referendum on local public transportation management in 
Rome. The paper concludes that the economic crisis and subsequent transformations of party 
politics and participation encouraged a politicization of the issues around local public services, 
as well as a shift in the related policy discourse. The parties’ choices and policy frames were 
guided mainly by a strategic logic defined in relation to the salience of the LPS issue and the 
competitive context. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The austerity measures instituted by many European governments in response to 
the economic crisis particularly affected the Local Public Services (LPSs) sector by rein-
forcing neoliberalization (Brenner et al. 2010) through outsourcing, privatization and 
marketization. This process was particularly marked in the Mediterranean economies, 
though it produced distinct results in each (Lippi and Tsekos 2019). However, the polit-
ical discourses and policy frames that accompanied the political decisions of the last 
few years have been given limited attention in the scholarly literature. While the his-
torically managerial approach taken by much of the LPSs sector has often justified poli-
cy and technical choices on the basis of operational efficiency, the quality of public ser-
vices cannot be evaluated solely in economic terms. It also depends on citizens’ experi-
ences with the services provided, and more broadly, on the satisfaction of the larger 
community (Pollitt and Bouckaert 1995). The economic crisis has accentuated the con-
flict between the logic of markets and the logic of citizenship (Schaefer and Streek 
2013), amplifying the dissonance between citizens and governments (Mair 2013). In 
many European countries, this has led to the rise or strengthening of various national 
and local movements (i.e. Indignados in Spain and Greece; Movimento per l’acqua 
pubblica in Italy; Rebel cities and new municipalism at the local level) and protest par-
ties (e.g. Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy). Among other 
things, these movements have strongly opposed the privatization of various sectors 
and promoted a greater focus on common goods (Morlino and Raniolo 2018; Mayer et 
al. 2016).  
In this context, we ask whether: a) the issue of LPSs management has undergone in-
creasing politicization and political differentiation along party lines in recent years; and 
b) the causes of these eventual differentiations.  
In this article, we attempt to answer these questions by analyzing the debate on 
LPSs that has developed in Italy since 2008. Because of the influence the managerial 
approach has in this area of policy, the austerity measures introduced since the eco-
nomic crisis and the correlated political and policy consequences, Italy is a paradigmat-
ic case in the European panorama (Gualmini 2008). This article will therefore recon-
struct the frames used by the principal parties through analysis of both electoral mani-
festos and press reviews of articles relevant to LPSs in three newspapers (La Repubbli-
ca, Il Sole 24 Ore and Il Messaggero). Particular attention will be paid to the 2011 ref-
erendum against the privatization of LPSs and the 2018 referendum on local public 
transportation management in Rome.  
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2. The politics of policy instrument selection 
 
The identification of policy problems, as well as the tools to solve them and relative 
solutions, is not a neutral activity, involving a series of actors with different interests, 
who can refer to and elaborate different policy frames. Frames can be defined as “co-
herent systems of normative and cognitive elements which define, in a given field, 
‘world views’, mechanisms of identity formation, principles of actions, as well as meth-
odological prescriptions and practices for actors subscribing to the same frame” (Surel 
2000, 496). They help to reduce the complexity of reality, facilitating the actors’ choice. 
Generally, the construction and comparison of different policy frames have been asso-
ciated with the agenda-setting phase, considering the selection of policy tools as a con-
sequent phase of a coherent policy strategy, without a real discussion because of the 
neutral and mechanical nature of the tools themselves. Yet, as Braun and Capano 
(2010) point out, part of the literature has highlighted the subjective dimension of poli-
cy instruments, their conceptual and empirical autonomy (Linder and Peters 1998; 
Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004). The choice of policy instruments is the sequence of im-
agined actions through which decision-makers articulate their decision-making ration-
ality, prefiguring the expected effects of their action according to a theory of change 
(Weiss 1998). As a consequence, "the choice of policy instruments is no less controver-
sial than the choice of policy itself" (Howlett and Ramesh 2006, 87).  
Until the end of the 1970s, the instruments used to govern were considered the 
consequence of an assumption of legal rationality. The ends and means belonged to 
the same sphere of meaning: that of the state, as the monopolistic arena of policymak-
ing (Capano and Lippi 2010, 7). With the transition from government to governance, 
there has been a "pluralisation of the means" that can be adopted to reach a given end 
and the emergence of “more complex dynamics of identification of problems, mobiliza-
tion of values and rhetoric, sharing of meanings, identification of resources, articula-
tions of projects and solutions” (Ibidem, 8). The choice of instruments is therefore not 
neutral, nor does it respond only to an instrumental logic. Strategies and tools are also 
symbolic, subject to evaluation, and can be molded to fit various interests (Capano and 
Lippi 2017). Nor is a given strategy or tool chosen for exclusively technical reasons 
(Feigenbaum and Henig 1994): these choices are shaped both by decision-makers’ 
preferences and contextual constraints (Howlett 2004). The selected tool must there-
fore be acceptable to the public (if the issue is salient to a wider audience) or to a spe-
cific target, not to mention in line with the preferences of the policy makers involved 
(Capano and Lippi 2017).  
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As in the previous phases of the policy cycle, the choice of instruments is also char-
acterized by the communicative interaction between the various actors involved in the 
process. “The features of arguments and the way they are utilized play a crucial role” 
(Liberatore 1995, 60). Although the policy arenas have become increasingly crowded, 
parties still play a central role, competing with each other through different policy 
packages. They affect the articulation of the political debate and define the political 
space, emphasizing or de-emphasizing certain issues, depending on their preferences 
or the reputation developed with respect to certain policy areas or programs (Budge 
and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). Even when they are induced by external events or by 
other actors to thematize some issues (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994) they can try to 
differentiate themselves by proposing different policy frames.  
This paper seeks to contribute to the larger debate on the logic of instrument choice 
(Peters 2002; Howlett 2004; Capano and Lippi 2017) by examining the parties’ policy 
discourses and theoretical frameworks that have shaped the management of LPSs in 
the last decade. The construction of these frameworks, and consequently the ways in 
which collective problems are formulated, allow us to reflect on the political nature of 
the policy tools and solutions that have been put into play. It is precisely in the phase 
of problem definition that the capacity to channel and focus public attention comes to 
the fore, allowing solutions to emerge. After all, as Schattschneider (1975, 66) reminds 
us, “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power”. 
 
 
3. Marketization and de-politicization in the policy sector of LPSs 
 
This analysis focuses on LPSs for two main reasons which, despite appearances, are 
only apparently contradictory. In the first place, LPS’ relevance has grown in European 
local governance both because of the large share of the budget they receive from local 
authorities and because of their importance to citizens’ daily life (Lippi and Tsekos 
2019; Pollitt and Bouckaert 1995).  
From another perspective, the majority of European democracies have witnessed a 
process of “discursive depoliticization” in the LPSs sector (Hay 2007; De Nardis 2017). 
LPSs management has been reframed as a question of technical expertise, a neutral 
process that is completely separate from political considerations (Sanderson 1996, 97). 
Since the 1980s, the spread of the New Public Management (NPM) approach has 
opened up a gradual process of market-oriented regulatory restructuring (Brenner et 
al. 2010) that has generally led to the "hollowing out of the state" (Rhodes 1994), fa-
voring the transfer of public functions to private actors. NPM theories and reform pro-
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posals – despite assuming different characteristics in different countries - were orient-
ed at reducing the costs of the public sector by improving its efficiency and effective-
ness (Bolgherini and Dallara 2016). In the LPSs sector, this meant a tendency towards 
replacing the direct public delivery of utilities with the use of contracting-out.  
Since the 1990s, liberalization and competition have become the guiding principles 
in building the EU single market. Following these principles, national European gov-
ernments have actively promoted market rules and encouraged privatization in various 
sectors (telecommunications, railways, gas, health, waste, etc.), trying to face the new 
governance challenges, avoiding the risk of political overload and reducing the visibility 
of political responsibility (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Lippi and Tsekos 2019), but pro-
ducing unintended consequences in terms of government capacity and public legitima-
cy (Matthews 2012, 289). 
The 2008 crisis gave a new impetus to the public spending cuts approach. However, 
subsequent attempts to reintroduce NPM methods have been largely restricted to fis-
cal targets (Lippi and Tsekos 2019), producing a sort of “zombie NPM” (Dunleavy 2010). 
In many European countries, recent austerity measures have transferred social and en-
vironmental externalities to the local level, hardening fiscal discipline and further 
weakening the capabilities of the state and the public sector through outsourcing, pri-
vatization and marketization of public and social services.  
The framing, or “good reasons”, narratives and symbolic instruments used by politi-
cal actors to give their choices the patina of objectivity, has attracted less scholarly at-
tention (Stone 2001). According to Entman (1993, 52), “to frame is to select some as-
pects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in 
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”. The stories or narratives, participants 
are disposed to tell about policy situations are at the base of policy frames (Rein and 
Schön 2002). Therefore, we can say that “the words we use help set the parameters 
whereby policy can be imagined” (Warner and Clifton 2013, 3).  
It is in this context that we ask if and how party policy discourses – meant as “mech-
anisms by which frames contest the understanding of a policy problem” (Zito 2011, 
1926) -  on LPSs have changed in the aftermath of the “critical juncture” (Della Porta et 
al. 2017) represented by the economic crisis and the consequent transformations in 
politics (increased popular activism and radicalized competition) and policy (a push to-
wards liberalization). We expect the issue to have experienced a gradual politicization, 
or increased salience (De Wilde 2011), and a concomitant increase in differentiation 
between parties’ stances. We will test this hypothesis by analyzing the Italian case.  
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4. Re-politicizing LPSs? The case of Italy 
 
There are various factors that led to this analysis of the public debate surrounding 
LPSs management in Italy.  
Firstly, in recent decades, Italy has provided a good example of governments’ ten-
dency to spend more on outsourcing and increase the range of services delivered 
through external contractors (see Savas 2000; Romzek and Johnston 2005). While Italy 
has one of the lowest percentages of procurement over public expenditure (just over 
20% as opposed to an OECD average of 29%) at the national level, its local tiers of gov-
ernment are conversely among the most prolific (almost 80% as opposed to an OECD 
average of just over 60%) (OECD 2015). 
Secondly, like other Mediterranean countries when the crisis worsened in 2011, Italy 
was required to enter into budgetary compliance and introduce both structural re-
forms as well as policies designed to promote competition in the LPS sector (“austerity 
by recommendation”) (Lippi and Tsekos 2019, 35).  
In many ways, Italian democracy is more generally a political laboratory for the re-
cent transformations in participation and competition experienced by various Europe-
an countries (Morlino and Raniolo 2018). While the panorama of participation in Italy 
did not give rise to an organic protest movement such as Spain’s Indignados, a series of 
territorially rooted, single issue and environmental movements did emerge (No Tav, 
Ilva di Taranto) (Della Porta et al. 2015). In particular, the Acqua, Bene Comune (Water, 
A Common Good) movement arose explicitly in opposition to the privatization of the 
water utilities. In the context of institutional politics, the above movement was fol-
lowed by the so-called ‘season of the orange mayors’, in which a wave of cities elected 
mayors with a sensitivity towards and interest in issues surrounding common goods. 
These included Luigi De Magistris in Naples, Massimo Zedda in Cagliari and Giuliano Pi-
sapia in Milan. 
This was paralleled by the decline of Italy’s two main parties, the centre-left Partito 
Democratico (PD) and the centre-right Popolo delle Libertà/Forza Italia (PdL/FI). This 
decline benefited both the new protest party Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) and the far 
right party Lega Nord (LN), helping them to rise to joint government following the 2018 
elections.  
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5. Hypothesis and methods 
 
According to Boin et al. (2009), a state of crisis, understood as an interruption in so-
cial routines and expectations, constitutes an opportunity for political actors to rede-
fine the issues at hand, propose policy innovations and organizational reforms, in-
crease their popularity and defeat the opposition. The moment generates “frames and 
counter-frames concerning the nature and severity of a crisis, its causes, the responsi-
bility for its occurrence or escalation, and implications for the future. Contestants ma-
nipulate, strategize and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative” 
(ibid., 82). The resulting clash between competing frames creates both political conse-
quences and policy changes: the former in the form of conflict between the govern-
ment and the opposition regarding responsibility for the crisis, while the latter is em-
bodied by the battle between those who would maintain the administrative and regu-
latory status quo versus those who favor a change. This dynamic was also present fol-
lowing the Great Recession and intensified the conflict between traditional and protest 
parties, those in support of austerity and those in opposition (Morlino e Raniolo 2018). 
It was also present in the debate between a further “hollowing out” of LPSs and a 
“push back” against marketization (Warner and Clifton 2013). Based on these premis-
es, we therefore expect that:  
H1) Beginning with the economic crisis and following the resulting transformations 
of political participation and competition, the allocation and management of LPSs 
have undergone a process of increasing politicization in which the issue has be-
come the subject of inter-party conflict. 
But what are the actual differences in the ways parties frame LPSs? What deter-
mines those differences? Do parties’ frames change over time? 
On the base of a spatial theory of party competition (Downs 1957), the policy frames 
proposed by the parties may tend to be stable, reflecting their ideological values and 
orientations. As a consequence, we would expect left parties to be less favorable to-
wards outsourcing public services due to their support for greater public spending and 
economic intervention on the part of the public sector. Nonetheless, other studies 
have demonstrated the spuriousness of this assumption (Bel and Fageda 2007, 527), as 
well as how parties’ dominant belief systems, institutional contexts and competitive 
goals shape their choice of policy instruments. More generally parties’ positions on a 
given issue are informed both by the values at the core of their political identities, but 
also on the basis of strategic considerations tied to their competitive goals (Raniolo 
2013). As mentioned in the previous section, according to the salience theory of party 
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competition (Green-Pedersen 2012; Budge 1982), parties compete by emphasizing the 
issues that are both electorally productive and that reflect their identities. However, 
they might also choose their focuses in reaction to changes in the political arena or as a 
response to their competitors (Meyer and Rosenmberger 2015). In the latter case, poli-
cies appear to be strategic representations of problems (Stone 2001), and frames - be-
ing based on interpretation and selection - can be challenged (Braun and Capano 
2010). Moreover, given that the policy arenas have become increasingly plural, parties 
- faced with the weakening of their role as main gatekeepers - can build more ambigu-
ous and changeable policy frames, capable of placating multiple political actors in a 
policy controversy (Dekker 2017) or more in line with interest groups oriented to influ-
ence the policy process (Dür and Mateo 2013).  Therefore, we further expect that:  
H2) parties have constructed contingent oppositional frames around LPSs accord-
ing to a competitive (rather than identity) logic defined in relation to the changing 
political context and salience of the issue.  
We will attempt to confirm these two hypotheses by analyzing the national policy 
debate surrounding LPSs both before and after the 2008 economic crisis, identifying 
the principal frames constructed by each party. Particularly we will focus on the policy 
frames elaborated by those parties that have occupied over time relevant positions in 
the party system: the centre-left PD, the centre right PDL/FI and the Terzo Polo, the 
radical right Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) and the Lega Nord (LN) (emerged initially as a regional-
ist party); the various small radical left and libertarian parties (Rifondazione Comunista 
(RC), Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (SEL), the Greens) and the populist-protest parties (Ita-
lia dei Valori (IdV), Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S)). Secondly, we will analyze the debates 
that arose during the preparation and execution of the 2011 abrogative referendum on 
the privatization of the water supply and the 2018 consultative referendum on public 
transport contract allocation methods in Rome. These two referendums indeed 
opened a policy window, allowing the flow of the three streams: the problem stream, 
the policy stream and the politics stream (Kingdon 1984; cfr. Lachapelle 2018 on the 
role of referendums).  
By examining both national and local contexts, we are able to analyze party dis-
courses in two distinct arenas and thus allowing us to view their logics of action 
through the lenses of different constraints and equilibriums. We will reconstruct the 
ways in which the debate surrounding LPSs is articulated (how it is framed), which 
voices prevail in the process of articulation and in what way. We will focus on analyzing 
the main parties’ electoral manifestos and press reviews of articles relevant to the lib-
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eralization of LPSs in La Repubblica and Il Sole 24 Ore from 2008 until the present1. Re-
garding the Roman public transport referendum, we will examine press reviews from 
the Roman editions of La Repubblica and Il Messaggero between 2016 and 2018, as 
well as the electoral manifestos of Rome’s mayoral candidates from 2008 onward.   
 
 
6. The pre-crisis phase: a mainstream pro-liberalization consensus (1990s-
2008) 
 
NPM administrative reforms were introduced in Italy throughout the Nineties, later 
than in the Anglo-saxon world, but before other countries in continental Europe, pro-
ducing organizational changes in formal structure and civil service (Bolgherini and Dal-
lara 2016; Gualmini 2008). 
In the context and aftermath of the major political and fiscal crisis between 1990 
and 1994 (the so-called “End of the First Republic” and the Maastricht Treaty negotia-
tions), far-reaching reforms were introduced at the national and local level: local gov-
ernment reforms (1990) for increased autonomy and NPM, a number of major national 
privatization and corporatization initiatives (energy, oil and gas etc.), the direct election 
of mayors (1993), and the reform of public works procurement (1994). These policy in-
terventions were linked by the shared goal of separating political and managerial re-
sponsibility in order to fight corruption after the Tangentopoli scandals, increase eco-
nomic efficiency, and reduce the influence of party-politics on day-to-day manage-
ment.  
Soon after (1994-2000), a number of legislative acts transferred these concepts – 
competition, privatization, contracting-out - into sectorial reforms of local utilities - wa-
ter (1994), waste (1997), transport (1997), energy (1999) and gas (2000) - and of social 
services (Act 328/2000).  
 
1 The choice of the three newspapers is based on their different editorial character: Il Sole 24 Ore is a 
business newspaper owned by the prominent industrial association Confindustria; La Repubblica is an in-
dependent general-interest daily newspaper; Il Messaggero is a daily newspaper with a very wide section 
dedicated to the city of Rome. This difference is useful to reconstruct the frames of the various political 
actors as well as to identify the more or less saliency of the LPS issue in the political debate. Over 450 arti-
cles published since 2008 were selected (290 from Il Sole 24 Ore, 120 from La Repubblica, 57 from Il Mes-
saggero) using the following keywords: “local public services/local utilities”, “municipal corporations”, 
“public procurement code”, “common goods”, “water referendum”, “Atac/Atac referendum”, “Roman 
public transportation referendum”. Only the articles that are expressly quoted in the text will be cited in 
the references. The analysis includes all major parties’ manifestos since the 2008 political elections and the 
2008 municipal elections in the city of Rome. 
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Two opposing tendencies emerged in the wake of the first wave of reforms. On the 
one hand, successive centre-right and centre-left cabinets and parliaments were con-
stantly discussing a general reform of local utilities that would impose competitive ten-
dering of contracts. Such a general reform was never approved, given the opposition 
from the regionalist party, right-wing coalition member LN and radical left-wing coali-
tion member RC. On the other hand, micro-legislation was passed in repeated, frag-
mented decision-making processes which alternatively made contracting out compul-
sory, then optional, then detailed the scope of “in-house” provision by municipal cor-
porations, then gave or took incentives for contracting or delivering in-house (Citroni et 
al. 2019). One such micro-decision, inserted in the annual “EU Law” (166/2009) (which 
calibrates the details of existing laws to new EU regulations) did indeed impose com-
pulsory competitive tendering for all local utilities delivered by municipalities. It was 
the so-called “Ronchi decree”, promoted by the centre-right government (PdL, LN).  
During this phase, the PdL and the PD shared a pro-liberalization frame, inspired by 
three main themes: modernization of public administration, economic development 
and reduction of costs of politics (see Ronchi qdt. in Gasparini 2009, 26; Minister Lanzil-
lotta qdt. in Iezzi 2008, 9).  
The RC and the LN remained the exceptions to this shared vision (see electoral pro-
grammes): the first for an ideological preference for the LPSs public management and 
the second for its strong presence in northern cities where LPSs were often managed 
by big municipal companies (Citroni et al. 2008).  
 
 
7. The post-crisis phase: LPS’ framing is diversified (2009-2018) 
 
When the crisis reached its peak in Italy in 2011, LPSs became a salient topic in the 
public debate and came to inform the contrast between the pro- and anti-liberalization 
frames. The second frame was exemplified by the movement for a public water supply. 
The movement - despite having existed since the early 2000s - gained wider im-
portance precisely in reaction to the Ronchi decree, perceiving a retrenchment of citi-
zenship rights (Mettler and Soss 2004) and implementing a winning "outside lobbying" 
(Dür and Mateo 2013) referendum campaign. 
Though the referendum applied to all LPSs, the public and political debate focused 
predominantly on the water supply chain. The movement elaborated a “challenging 
discourse” (Bathia and Coleman 2003), based on a counter-frame where privatization 
became: a) synonymous with increased costs and reduced efficiency for the sole pur-
pose of profit maximization (Cfr. Cillis 2009, 26; La Repubblica 2009); b) expression of a 
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neoliberal economic model oriented towards the “privatizzazione del sistema Italia” or 
privatization of Italy (activist qdt. in Cerino 2010) and the reduction of citizens’ rights. 
In fact, the public water movement joined the larger wave of protest against the capi-
talist system and the limits of representative democracy that emerged during the crisis 
years in various European contexts (Della Porta et al. 2017).  
Party actors were marginal in the construction of this particular frame. The leftist 
parties outside parliament (RC, SEL), the Green party and the centrist IdV, supported a 
repeal of the Ronchi decree, sharing with the movement similar value and identity rea-
sons. The mainstream parties tried to de-emphasize the issue, remaining relatively 
neutral until the referendum forced them to take a stand. The PD – at that time in op-
position - supported the reasons behind the referendum while the centre-right was di-
vided between supporting the decree, abstaining (PdL) and maintaining their silence 
(Terzo Polo and partially the LN). 
Notwithstanding the resounding victory for the Public Water movement (see section 
8), the months following the referendum witnessed a resurgence of a traditional fram-
ing of LPSs in which liberalization was presented as a smart response to the economic 
crisis.  
In a letter addressed to PM Silvio Berlusconi, EU monetary and financial authorities 
Trichet and Draghi drew a list of vital, urgent policy measures that Italy must carry out 
to secure its financial situation: the “full liberalization of local public services” was 
prominent among them. This letter was central in defining the role of Mario Monti’s 
new technical cabinet, supported by all main political parties (Galbiati 2011). Its guiding 
principles were both “competition for the market”, through a limitation to in-house 
provision, and “competition in the market”, liberalising all possible sectors (De Vincen-
ti, Undersecretary for economic development, qtd. in Santilli 2012, 16). 
The issue of liberalization nonetheless remained the subject of lively debate. When 
the government again attempted to impose competitive tendering on local authorities, 
six Regions appeal to the Constitutional Court, which ruled that governments could not 
reinstate norms repealed by referendum. This decision was welcomed by the radical 
left and the movement for Acqua pubblica in general, whereas the governing coalition 
parties maintained that “even after this decision, heavy doses of competition for and in 
the market must be introduced in the ‘petrified’ system of local utilities, so that utilities 
may cease to be the locus (…) of the clientelistic attitudes of bad local politics” (Galletti, 
Lanzillotta and Della Vedova 2012, 9). 
In this period, there was an increase in articles (cfr. Biondi and Trovati 2012; Trovati 
2013) that stigmatized the costs and debts of many municipal corporations, identifying 
“municipal capitalistic socialism” as both the source of political distortions and “the re-
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al obstacle to an open-market and free-competition policy in strategic sectors of the 
economy” (Santilli 2013, 45).  
At this stage, the new protest party, the M5S, became central in political competi-
tion and raised the issues of “the fight against the political caste” and the public sec-
tor’s fiscal wastefulness. Both the PD (2013) and M5S2 entered the 2013 general elec-
tions juggling two potentially contradictory positions. In order to capitalise on the suc-
cess of the referendum, both had to be in favor of a public water supply; however, they 
also had to take a stand against the waste of public money represented by municipal 
corporations given the rising salience of the issue. The center-right coalition, on the 
other hand, had the more straightforward job of supporting liberalization and privati-
zation outright (PdL 2013; LN 2013). 
Since then, all the (large-coalition and centre-left) cabinets have advocated signifi-
cant cuts in municipal companies. The failed attempt of the centre-left government 
(2014), led by Matteo Renzi, to reduce the number of municipal companies and initiate 
a general reform aimed at limiting the in-house provision in favour of liberalization (see 
Trovati 2018), was described by the M5S as an expression of the traditional parties’ 
willingness to trade favors and privileges in exchange for electoral consensus3. In this 
case we can see the emergence of a third frame - the anti-establishment frame - that 
proposes a different interpretation of the problem and of causal relationships: the 
choices of the policy instruments adopted until then in the LPSs field were the expres-
sion of a self-referential political class, detached from the citizens' interests. 
The frames proposed by the PD and M5S during the 2018 elections continued along 
contrasting lines: modernization was key for the former, while the latter focused on its 
opposition to the political caste. The PD’s frames concentrated on justifying its pro-
liberalization stance and emphasize the protections its regulations afforded to citizens 
(PD 2018). This last represented a shift away from the language used in 2008, which 
framed the public as ‘consumers’ rather than citizens (PD 2008). In essence, the pro-
posed policy instrument was the same as in the past, but part of its justification 
changed as a reflection of a transformed competitive environment.  
The M5S, on the other hand, promoted more efficient and accessible models for 
LPSs management, a public water supply and completely public management of local 
public transport (that is, without privatization or contracting-out) (M5S 2018). Of the 
 
2 See for e.g: https://www.movimento5stelle.it/parlamento/bilancio/2014/07/il-m5s-e-il-buco-delle-
societa-partecipate.html 
3 http://www.movimento5stelle.it/parlamento/2014/12/renzi-aumenta-le-tasse-agli-italiani-e-tiene-
intatte-le-poltrone.html; 
https://www.ilblogdellestelle.it/2014/12/il_ritmo_di_renzie_piu_tasse_per_piu_poltrone.html 
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centre-right parties, only Fratelli d’Italia referenced the issue, confirming its position 
that municipal corporations should operate only in certain strategic sectors, leaving the 
rest subject to the competition of the open market4. On the other side, Liberi e Uguali, 
a new party born from a schism within the PD, favored public management of LPSs if 
said management could be rendered more efficient (Muroni, LeU candidate, 2018).  
The above reconstruction of events illustrates the ever-increasing politicization of 
LPSs from 2011 onward (H1). The deepening economic crisis and consequent shifts in 
political participation and competition were critical, as were the public water move-
ment and competitive cleavages. Three distinct frames came to define the larger 
theme of LPSs: pro-liberalization, anti-liberalization and, relatively later, anti-
establishment (see Tab. 1) (H2). 
 
Tab. 1 Main frames in the Italian political discourse on Local Public Services 
 Main Frames and “good rea-
sons” 
Main political parties and actors 
Before the  
economic crisis 
1990s-2008 
Pro-liberalization Frame: 
Modernization of public admin-
istration; economic develop-
ment; reduction costs of politics. 
Centre-left and centre-right par-
ties. Opposition of peripheral 
parties (radical left; Lega Nord) 
After the  
economic crisis 
2009-2018 
Anti-Liberalization Frame: 
privatization of water and other 
utilities as increasing costs and 
inefficiency; Customers vs citi-
zens; logic of profit. 
 
Pro-Liberalization: response to 
the economic crisis; efficiency; 
modernization. 
“Acqua pubblica” Movement 
and radical left parties; Greens; 
Idv. PD (partially and only for 
water); M5S. 
 
Technical government (2011-
2012); main centre-left and cen-
tre-right  
 
 
From the above discussion, we can begin to identify shared characteristics in the 
parties’ discourses across these divisions. All were lacking in pragmatic engagement 
with the data on the quality of services offered, the administrative capacities in play or 
actual monitoring and regulatory practices, instead focusing prevalently on a more 
general strategic approach.  
 
 
 
4 http://www.fratelli-italia.it/le-sfide-per-l-italia-9-gennaio-pomeriggio 
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8. Water and democracy: grassroots politicization  
 
The 2011 referendum proposed the question of rescinding the regulations that 
mandated private LPSs management and adjusted water supply tariffs in proportion to 
capital investment. 95,3% of the participants voted yes to rescinding the former norm 
and 95,8% to do away with the latter. The public debate centered on water supply 
management, largely because of the symbolic power of the issue. Because access to 
water is instinctively perceived as a human right, attempts at privatization evoke a 
sense that free market capitalism as being privileged at the expense of that right (Ber-
sani 2011, 51). The movement for “water as a public good” comprised a wide network 
of environmental, catholic and union associations, NGOs, territorial groups and civil so-
ciety in general. Originating in the early 2000’s, the movement was in part tied to the 
international context of no-global mobilizations and various social forums. The regional 
and local battles for de-privatization of water and the formation of the Italian Forum 
for public water movements also played key roles. The movement gained greater mo-
mentum from 2009 onwards when it reacted to the Berlusconi government’s proposals 
with the referendum campaign, which obtained one million, four hundred thousand 
signatures between April 24 and July 10, 2010 (Bersani 2011).  
During this preparatory phase, the political parties were largely absent from the dis-
course. Only the extra-parliamentary radical left (the RC, SEL and Sinistra Critica) and 
the Green Federation were prepared to openly ally with the movement steering com-
mittee, which was comprised of associations and territorial committees. The centrist 
party IdV initially attempted to launch an alternative call for a referendum despite its 
support for the overall cause. It nonetheless ended up uniting itself to the larger grass-
roots movement eventually.  
The PD and PdL, on the other hand, chose to minimize the importance of the refer-
endum, considering it an expression of the public’s misunderstanding of the Ronchi de-
cree. Stefania Prestigiacomo, then the Minister for the Environment, stated (qtd. in Pe-
ruzzi 2011, 13): “the referendum on the water supply is completely pointless: the gov-
ernment’s reform is just and offers every guarantee (…) they have speculated on the 
topic of water, even knowing that it isn’t a good that can be privatized (…)”.  
Prominent elements of the centre-left supported that position, dismissing the refer-
endum as “anachronistic” (Bassanini qtd. in Santilli 2010), a return to the past or even 
an expression of a culture of “abnegation and resignation” (Vigneri, undersecretary in 
the centre-left government, qtd. in Santilli 2010). In the case of both PdL and PD, it is 
possible to identify a strategy of "blame avoidance" (Howlett 2014), consisting in the 
attempt to delegitimize the content of the movement's discourse, its own objectives 
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and the instrument to achieve them (the referendum). More specifically, the PD pro-
posed a law that was partially in conflict with the question posed by the referendum. It 
sought to link the notion of water as a common good and human right (bene comune 
dell’umanità (Art. 2, comma 1)) with water supply management as a service in the pub-
lic economic interest (servizio di interesse economico generale (Art. 7, comma 1)). The 
party furthermore considered referendums to be both an inefficient tool (because of 
the difficulties posed by reaching a quorum) and essentially unproductive (referen-
dums contest existing laws, rather than proposing new ones). The PD, then guided by 
Pierluigi Bersani, therefore limited itself to expressing its “sympathy” for the move-
ments opposing privatization5. Many local circles and activists within the PD nonethe-
less joined in the movement outright (Bersani 2011). 
For Stefano Rodotà (2011, 37), one of the most influential intellectuals involved in 
the battle to de-privatize the water supply, the months of campaigning for signatures 
demonstrated the existence of two different worlds. One world was that of “the ever-
increasing presence of movements on the ground (in the streets)”, the other was that 
of “the parties closed up in their palaces (or on tv)”, but both worlds shared a mutual 
diffidence. The slogan “it’s spelled water but pronounced democracy” was widely used 
at protests organized by the Forum to express the greater significance of the issue at 
hand. It was a declaration that the battle for public water was only one aspect of an 
ongoing fight for the larger common good and for citizens’ ability to participate in polit-
ical decision-making. In fact, some within the rather diverse alliance in support of a 
public water supply identified water liberalization as part of a more general design “to 
demobilise the public hand (…) derived from a lethal mix of ideological fury and big in-
terests” (Nivarra 2010, 19). As Della Porta et al. (2015, 73) maintain, “focusing atten-
tion on a democracy based on the common ownership of common goods is thus an im-
portant theme in encouraging democratic participation and decision making in the Ital-
ian context”. From this last point of view, the movement's choice of using the referen-
dum instrument can be interpreted as a consequence of the framing process at the ba-
sis of its collective identity: the recognition of the right to public water as part of a 
broader right of citizenship and participation in the decision-making process (Vanhala 
2009; Jacquot and Vitale 2014). 
It was therefore no coincidence that an emergent M5S chose to adopt and build on 
this concept. When the proposed referendum reached the critical number of signa-
tures, M5S founder Beppe Grillo commented: “finally, some great news (…) Today, one 
million four hundred thousand signatures in favor of a referendum on the public water 
 
5 https://www.partitodemocratico.it/archivio/acqua-un-bene-comune-pubblico/ 
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supply were delivered to the Court of Appeals by activist groups that operated com-
pletely outside of the party system. If all goes well, there will be a vote in the spring of 
2011. I’d like to see the PdL and PDminusL try and stop the referendum (though of 
course they’ll try in every way they can)”6. 
 
 
8.1 The referendum and the parties’ strategic response 
 
As the June 2011 referendum drew near, the parties were almost forced to take po-
sitions vis a vis the vote. This phase emphasized the differences between the PD and 
the centre-right while simultaneously highlighting the fissures within each party and 
coalition (both between leadership and membership and between different currents). 
With a few weeks left until the vote, the PD threw their complete support behind the 
referendum’s cause and even contributed to final days of the campaign. However, 
some party members were less convinced, expressing continued support for the Ronchi 
decree or outright opposition to the referendum’s aims (see for e.g. Renzi qtd. in Vanni 
2011).  
The centre-right also failed to present a cohesive response. The PdL intended to ab-
stain from the vote, thus avoiding the need to take a position (La Repubblica 2011a). 
On the other hand, the leader of the LN Umberto Bossi called the referendum’s ques-
tions “attractive” and many of the League’s administrators were openly in favor of 
treating water as a common resource (ibid.). Lastly, the Terzo Polo (third pole), consist-
ing of centrist parties such as the Unione di Centro (UdC) and the right-wing of 
Gianfranco Fini’s Futuro e Libertà, promoted participation in the referendum without 
expressing a preference on the potential results. Naturally, as the author of the con-
tested decree, Minister Ronchi distanced himself from this neutral stance (ibid.). 
Thanks to its increased salience and wide appeal, party competition came to include 
the issue of privatization of water supply. This was clearly demonstrated by the parties’ 
reactions to the popular vote and consequent sweeping victory of Yes to both ques-
tions on the referendum (see tab. 2).  
For M5S, the success of the referendum presents a building block in constructing 
their discourse on the conflict between the people and the party caste. For the tradi-
tional parties in opposition to the centre-right (the PD, the radical left and the Terzo 
Polo), the referendum’s success instead represented the crisis of legitimacy of the Ber-
lusconi government and thus an opportunity to call for a vote of no confidence. The 
 
6 http://www.beppegrillo.it/referendum-sullacqua-pubblica/ 
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Secretary of the PD confirmed: “it was a referendum on divorce. A divorce between the 
government and the country. What was a clearly declared political crisis now takes the 
form of a profound distance from the citizenry" (Bersani qtd. in La Repubblica 2011b). 
 
Table 2. Parties’ positions in the Referendum on Privatization of Water Services 
Political  
Parties 
In favour/against  
privatization of water 
 services 
Ideological Reasons Competitive Reasons 
Radical Left 
/Greens/Idv 
Against 
Water as common 
good; battle against 
capitalism 
Opposition to the government 
PD 
Against (after a phase of 
uncertainty and with in-
ternal divisions) 
Water as a  
common good 
Demonstrating the  
de-legitimation of the  
centre-right government. 
PDL 
In favour and for  
abstention 
Modernization 
and efficiency 
 
Minimize the relevance 
of the Referendum 
 
LN 
Against  
(with ambiguities) 
Water as a  
common good 
Keeping the consensus of local  
administrators and the electoral 
base; at the same time maintain-
ing a coherent position with its  
government allies. 
M5S Against 
Water as a  
common good 
Opposition to traditional parties 
Terzo Polo 
Not declared but for  
participation to the  
referendum 
- 
Demonstrating the  
de-legitimation of the  
Berlusconi’s government 
 
Nichi Vendola, leader of SEL at the time, similarly felt that: “this isn’t a referendum 
on Berlusconi, but it certainly is a referendum on Berlusconi-ism (…) Berlusconi-ism, 
understood as the project of eradicating the culture of common goods, today reaches 
its endpoint, at its final stop” (qtd. in La Repubblica 2011b). 
Even for the leaders of the Terzo Polo, Pier Ferdinando Casini, Gianfranco Fini and 
Francesco Rutelli, “the YES to the referendum is a big NO united against this govern-
ment. It is about time Berlusconi listens” (ibid.). 
The success of the referendum further weakened the cohesiveness of the governing 
majority. Various representatives of the Lega saw the results as both a major blow to 
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the government and an opportunity to advance their agenda with allies of the govern-
ment, pushing for fiscal reform and regional autonomy for the North (see Calderoli qtd. 
in D’Argenio 2011). 
From this brief review, we see how the privatization of the water supply went from 
being the subject of only “contentious politics” to playing a major role in the electoral 
arena as part of the main parties’ competitive and vote seeking strategies. Despite the 
way the more radical political forces immediately took positions based on political vi-
sions as well as their oppositional roles, the parties’ choices seem guided by a strategic 
rather than ideological logic. The PD’s initial distance with the movement’s position 
and its prolonged indecision7 perfectly illustrate the point, as do the League’s and Ter-
zo Polo’s ambiguity despite the PdL’s invitation to abstention. The widespread and last-
ing grassroots mobilization acted like an “external stimulus” to institutional politics, 
forcing the parties to legitimize their positions.  
 
 
9. LPT in Rome and the parties’ proposals (2008-2016) 
 
Roma Capitale’s public transportation is entrusted in house to municipal corporation 
ATAC Roma, and a private operator called Roma Tpl won the contract for 20% of the 
transport on wheels via public tender. ATAC experienced a series of problems culmi-
nating in a deficit of over a billion euros, accumulated between 2009 and 2014 (Bitetti 
and Genovese 2016). In 2015 only 4% to 26% of Roman citizens claimed to be satisfied 
or mostly satisfied with Rome’s public transportation. Rather, 38% and 27% declared 
themselves mostly unsatisfied or unsatisfied respectively (EC 2016). In addition, trans-
portation system personnel would frequently go on strike to protest working condi-
tions, paralyzing urban mobility (Bitetti and Genovese 2016). By examining mayoral 
candidates’ electoral manifestos from 2008 onwards, we can see how LPT manage-
ment has become increasingly important for electoral campaigns in direct parallel with 
the deteriorating quality of service and the public’s awareness of the issue. 
The principal candidates in the 2008 mayoral elections were Francesco Rutelli (PD) 
on the centre-left and Gianni Alemanno (PdL) on the centre-right. Rutelli proposed in-
vesting in transportation without specifying the nature of his proposed LPT manage-
ment scheme (Rutelli 2008). Alemanno, on the other hand, maintained that the pre-
ceding centre-left city governments had weakened the public transportation sector by 
 
7 In the years following the referendum the PD would further change its position, cfr: Bersani 2011; 
Sciotto A. (2016), “Blitz del PD e ciao all’acqua pubblica”, Il Manifesto, 16 March, 
https://ilmanifesto.it/blitz-del-pd-e-ciao-allacqua-pubblica/ 
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fragmenting the management companies, giving large foreign companies the oppor-
tunity to move in. Alemanno’s solution was to merge the various companies into one 
public transport management company (Alemanno 2008, 11). 
In 2013, LPT became a central theme in the mayoral electoral campaign. The PD’s 
candidate Ignazio Marino (2013) asserted that efficient public transportation was the 
first criterion for a major metropolis and blamed ATAC’s problems on parties’ interfer-
ence in the company and on the logic underlying nominations to its board of directors. 
After having merged the three transportation companies, being implicated in the 
“parentopoli” scandal and accused of promoting clientelistic hiring procedures within 
the company, Alemanno (2013) proposed greater integration with regional transporta-
tion services in light of economies of scale.  
In the first round of the 2016 elections, all the parties promised LPT reforms and 
guarantees of more efficient service from ATAC. In that race, the PD was represented 
by Roberto Giachetti, the M5S by Virginia Raggi, the right (Fdi and Lega) was led by 
Giorgia Meloni, the radical left by Stefano Fassina, and the FI supported Alfio Marchi-
ni’s list. None of these, however, promote a change in the modalities of LPT manage-
ment. Instead, their individual manifestos reflected the following elements in greater 
or lesser measures: requests for increased state funding, investment in infrastructure 
to increase rail and electric rail transportation, ways to limit abuse of the ticketing sys-
tem, more dedicated traffic lanes, incentives for alternative and sustainable transpor-
tation (bikes, car sharing, etc.), the internal reorganization of ATAC and acquisition of 
new rolling stock (see electoral manifestos).  
It was only in the second round of the elections between the PD and M5S that the 
contrast between public and private transportation management came under the spot-
light. The M5S in particular drew attention to the issue as part of their overarching citi-
zens vs. political caste narrative. They supported a continued public management of 
transport services and accused Giachetti of seeking privatization (Perrone 2016a). 
Giachetti himself avowed the intention to “fix the company” (Perrone 2016a), despite 
having admitted ambivalence regarding the involvement of private entities in munici-
pal management (Giachetti. qtd. in Canettieri 2016) and being considered in favor of 
privatization by various commentators (see Il Sole 24 Ore 2016, 22).  
Rome’s public transportation acquired relevance beyond the confines of the local 
parties following the M5S’s victory, involving the highest levels of the parties. Raggi’s 
difficulties in rebalancing the municipal company and resolving public transportation 
problems weighed on the M5S at the national level, damaging the party’s image (see 
Perrone 2016b). The opposition maintained that these difficulties demonstrated the 
new administration’s weakness. PD leader Matteo Renzi (qtd. in Cappelli 2017a) main-
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tained that Roman public transportation should be in the hands of private companies 
with demonstrated management capabilities rather than unions with pretensions to 
corporate governance. Renzi’s declaration foreshadowed the Roman PD’s pro-
liberalization stance regarding the referendum. As will be explained in the next section, 
however, there was no lack of uncertainties, internal conflicts and ambiguities. These 
will show that policy instruments care rarely be considered expressions of long-term 
political or ideological visions.  
 
9.1. The LPT referendum and partisan politics 
 
Rome held the consultative referendum on local public transportation on 11 No-
vember 2018. Only 16,4% of Roman citizens participated, and of those few, 74% voted 
in favor of liberalization. This result would scarcely be comprehensible if not for the 
fact that the parties barely publicized the referendum and only did so at the last mi-
nute (see Tab. 3), with the sole exception of the Radicali Italiani (RI) that had originally 
sponsored it. 
 
Table 3 - Parties’ positions in the Referendum on LPT in Rome 
Political 
Parties 
In favour/against liberalization of 
LPT 
Ideological Reasons Competitive Reasons 
RI In favour 
Modernization and 
efficiency 
Opposition to the M5S 
PD 
In favour  (after a phase of uncer-
tainty and with internal divisions) 
Modernization and 
efficiency 
Opposition to the M5S 
Sinistra e 
Libertà 
Against 
Opposition to  
neoliberal logic 
Differentiating itself from  
main parties 
FI 
In favour (after a phase of  
uncertainty) 
 
Modernization and 
efficiency 
Opposition to the M5S 
LN 
Against and for public-private  
collaboration 
(after a phase of uncertainty) 
- 
Differentiating itself from  
both the RI and the M5S 
M5S Against 
Supremacy of  
Citizenship 
Opposition to traditional par-
ties; keeping the support of  
trade unions 
FdI/other  
parties 
Against 
Supremacy of  
Citizenship 
Differentiating itself from  
main parties 
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The Radicali’s initiative was born out of the intersection of ATAC’s financial prob-
lems, the daily inconveniences experienced by the public and the impending expiration 
of the service provider’s contract (in 2019). These factors were useful to the party’s 
ideological tendency toward a market economy. In line with their managerial perspec-
tive, they maintained that a division between management and oversight guaranteed 
greater efficiency, in this case dissolving the “conflict of interest between the city and 
ATAC” (Magi qtd. in Cappelli 2017b).  
The campaign for the signatures necessary to hold the referendum was conducted 
almost exclusively by the RI. While individual PD members did participate, neither the 
party itself nor any other official political forces got involved (see D’Albergo 2017a). As 
in the case of the referendum on the water supply, the PD remained entirely unde-
clared: its fear of internal conflict left voters and party members entirely free to partic-
ipate or not in the campaign (see La Repubblica 2017a). The party again only declared 
itself in favor on the brink of the referendum, following an internal consultation of its 
Roman membership (out of 3.500 voters, 60% voted Yes). Despite the ambiguity of the 
wider party’s position, Giachetti felt that the Roman membership had expressed a 
stance that was clearly coherent with the “reformist” spirit of the party. It further pro-
vided him a pretext for the political condemnation of the Raggi administration because 
“ATAC is the paradigm of a city on its knees” (Giachetti 2018). 
The PD was not the only party to express uncertainty or avoid taking a stance. FI only 
came down in favor at the beginning of November, citing the potential advantages of 
competition (Bordoni, FI, qtd. in Gagliardi and Marini 2018) and incidentally taking the 
opportunity to oppose the M5S administration8. The League also delayed in declaring 
itself only to eventually come down in favor of the NO, thus both confirming its support 
for a public-private partnership and equally rejecting both Raggi and the Radicals 
(Pannacci S., LN qtd. in Gagliardi and Marini 2018). 
The M5S naturally maintained its anti-liberalization stance, accusing the Radicals of 
campaigning “on the backs of Romans and of the circa 11,700 employees” (Meleo qtd. 
in La Repubblica 2017b). M5S representatives held that the best solution would be to 
“relaunch ATAC as a public entity, because it should stay under the control of Roman 
citizens” (Meleo qtd. in D’Albergo 2017b) and that ceding it to private interests “would 
mean relinquishing public transportation to a profit-seeking mentality” (Raggi qtd. in La 
Repubblica, 2017c). While it was possible to identify an ideological matrix behind the 
M5S’ discourses, it was also evident that these issues were being instrumentalized 
against traditional parties, following a strategy of “blame avoidance” (Howlett 2014). 
 
8 Bordoni D., FI city council memeber, in  https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/556716/forza-italia-
conferenza-stampa-sul-referendum-si-mobilitiamo-roma-atac 
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These were accused of “serving murky, unidentified interests” (ibid.) or even of gutting 
the company in order to sell it off to private interests without a care for the employees 
(Pacetti qtd. in D’Albergo 2018).   
Fassina, Sinistra e Libertà representative and member of the “Atac bene comune” 
(ABC) committee, was particularly active on the NO side. He asserted that the pro-
posed LPT liberalization formed a part of the neoliberal trend dating back to the eight-
ies and that it would only lead to “immense profits for private contractors at the ex-
pense of citizens and workers” (Fassina qtd. in Gagliardi and Marini 2018). 
The No coalition was in fact particularly heterogeneous. It also included the radical 
right part of FdI and the far right Casapound (Gentile 2018), in addition to all the un-
ions. These last were convinced of the spuriousness of the “private is better” logic as 
well as the need to uncouple public management from party interference in order to 
promote greater responsiveness to the public’s needs (qtd. in La Repubblica 2018). 
In conclusion, the parties once again played a waiting game, delaying their choices 
until the last moment. On the one hand, all the parties took value-based positions, es-
pecially those with more radical ideologies relative to the left-right or people-political 
caste cleavages. On the other, the parties’ statements clearly demonstrate adversarial 
approaches oriented toward weakening their political opponents (Tab. 3).  
 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
The shift from government to governance has rendered the selection of strategic 
policy tools increasingly problematic because “the means have themselves become an 
end of the bargaining previously attributed solely to the identification and negotiation 
of the goals themselves” (Capano and Lippi 2010, 8). It has therefore become neces-
sary to engage in discursive legitimation of any chosen strategic policy instruments 
through the elaboration of “instrument frames” (Braun and Capano 2010, 22). This de-
velopment is clearly visible in our analysis of the evolution of discourses on LPSs policy 
in Italy. Italian parties have in fact constructed various frames aimed at legitimizing 
their preferences vis a vis the procurement and management of LPSs.  
In the pre-crisis period, the centre-right and centre-left parties shared a dominant 
frame inspired by managerial paradigms and therefore justified their push for liberali-
zation with the rhetoric of increased efficiency. It is with the economic crisis that the 
issue of the management of the LPSs acquires salience in the public debate with the 
confrontation of two tendencies: on the one hand, further attempts to justify liberali-
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zation processes; on the other hand, the elaboration of counter-frames - anti-
liberalization and anti-establishment - by new political actors (H1).  
The role of parties in the framing process seems to be reactive: they are induced to 
justify their choices in reaction to the visibility acquired by the LPS issue through the 
action of an extra-institutional actor - the water movement - or the intervention com-
ing from the supranational level. Parties' frames are anything but stable and well de-
fined. They are characterized by ambiguities and reflect both the parties' attempt to 
differentiate themselves from their political opponents and to find an equilibrium be-
tween the search for consensus and their opposition/government role (H2). In fact, our 
analysis revealed a wait-and-see attitude of the main parties in explaining their stance 
on the 2011 referendum, as well as attempts to de-emphasize the issue or even to use 
the referendum results instrumentally (both between the opposition and the govern-
ment and in the government coalition itself).  
Greater ideological coherence and adherence are visible in peripheral and radical 
parties (eg. the radical left, the M5S). At the same time, however, all parties tend to 
privilege adversarial attitudes, adapting to the context and emphasizing specific ele-
ments of the issue. In this regard, emblematic is the emphasis placed on a single aspect 
of the LPSs management – the municipal corporation - during the technical govern-
ment (2011-2012) and in the following years. This topic, while interpreted by main-
stream parties as a matter of efficiency and modernization, is linked by the challenger, 
the M5S, to its issue ownership: the opposition to the caste. 
The analysis of the political debate in the local arena confirms this analysis. The issue 
of LPT is fundamental in the local competition, being perceived as a problem by Rome’s 
citizens. However, the choice of policy instruments is never explicitly addressed until 
the policy window is opened by the referendum proposed by a peripheral party. This 
also shows the absence of an automatic continuity between the identification of a poli-
cy problem, its inclusion in the institutional agenda and the instruments selection, con-
firming that this last phase follows different political logics.  
In the local arena too, the main parties adopt a waiting approach aimed at de-
emphasizing the issue itself. They are faced with a policy controversy that requires 
combining different objectives: visibly searching for solutions to the inconvenience for 
the citizens, responding to the trade unions, pursuing an agreement between their 
own internal tendencies and differentiating from their political opponents. Their posi-
tions are not always ideologically consistent with those adopted in the national refer-
endum, actually changing the composition of the coalitions built around the different 
frames.  
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The present analysis of policy discourses only refers to one case study. The two ref-
erendums might be particular to the Italian situation and the theme of water - being a 
valence issue - may be an additional factor in explaining the inconsistency of the par-
ties. However, the analysis has generated hypotheses with potential for wider applica-
tion. Indeed, the post-crisis push towards the liberalization of LPSs and the changes in 
political participation and competition are present in other national contexts, especial-
ly in Southern Europe. 
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